## Online Appendix

# The Puzzling Effects of Monetary Policy in VARs: Invalid Identification or Missing Information?

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## 1 Robustness Checks

#### 1.1 Different Model Specifications

The following figures check the robustness of the results presented in the main text. Throughout, solid black lines and shaded areas refer to point estimates and 90% confidence bands of the benchmark specifications.

First, the external instrument VAR (second column in Figures 1-3). The benchmark specification includes log industrial production, the log consumer price index, the one-year government bond rate, and adds each variable of interest as the fourth variable. Figure [A1](#page-1-0) shows that the puzzling response of real exchange rates this benchmark specification yields are not an artifact of omitting financial market variables (as is the case for puzzling real activity effects, see [Herbst and Caldara,](#page-12-0) [2018\)](#page-12-0). Even when the set of core variables is expanded, the responses remain hard to square with economic theory.

Second, the recursively identified Dynamic Factor Model (third columns in Figure 1-3). The benchmark specification includes  $r = 16$  static factors and  $q = 4$  dynamic factors (following [Forni and Gam](#page-11-0)[betti,](#page-11-0) [2010\)](#page-11-0). Figure [A2](#page-1-1) shows that the exact number of static factors  $r$  is unimportant for the DFM results. Unsurprisingly, the results are more sensitive - but still quite robust - to the number of dynamic factors  $q$ , see Figure [A3.](#page-1-2) This is due to the fact that the identifying assumptions imposed by the recursive Cholesky scheme change as the dimension  $q$  changes, see Section [2.1.1.](#page-6-0)

Third, the dynamic factor model identified via an external instrument (Figure 5 in the main text). This model is robust to both  $r$  and  $q$ , see Figures [A4](#page-2-0) and [A5,](#page-2-1) respectively. The fact that the external instrument approach is robust with respect to  $q$  follows from the fact that the assumptions underlying this identification scheme are largely independent of  $q$ .

<span id="page-1-0"></span>

Figure A1: Real Exchange Rate Responses in Larger External Instruments VARs The dashed blue lines refer to five-variable VARs including [Gilchrist and Zakrajsek](#page-11-1) [\(2012\)](#page-11-1)'s excess bond premium. The red dashdot line refers to seven-variable VARs further including the 3-month commercial paper spread and the 30-year mortgage spread. In each case, the above plotted exchange rate is added sequentially - one at a time - to the VAR.

<span id="page-1-1"></span>

Figure A3: Different Number of Dynamic Factors in Cholesky DFM

<span id="page-1-2"></span>



<span id="page-2-0"></span>

Figure A4: Different Number of Static Factors in External Instrument DFM The dashed blue lines refer to models with  $r \in \{14, 15, 17, 18\}$ .

<span id="page-2-1"></span>

Figure A5: Different Number of Dynamic Factors in External Instrument DFM The dashed blue lines refer to models with  $q \in \{3, 5, 6\}$ .

## 1.2 Different External Instruments

Figure [A6](#page-3-0) checks the robustness of my results with respect to the set of potential instruments (see [Gürkay](#page-11-2)[nak et al.,](#page-11-2) [2005\)](#page-11-2). The benchmark specification uses surprise changes in the three month ahead fed funds future (following [Gertler and Karadi,](#page-11-3) [2015\)](#page-11-3). While the FAVAR and DFM results (last two panels) are largely robust, the VAR results (top panel) exhibit some noteworthy changes. In particular, using any of the three Eurodollar futures as instruments yield expansionary effects on output in the short-run.

#### Figure A6: Other Futures Surprises as External Instruments

<span id="page-3-0"></span>

#### (a) External Instrument VAR

Blue dashed lines: current month fed funds future. Red dash-dot lines: three month Eurodollar futures six month ahead. Green lines (\*): Eurodollar futures nine month ahead. Light blue lines (o): Eurodollar futures twelve month ahead.

### 1.3 Subsample Analysis

The following three figures reproduce Figures 1-3 in the main text for various subsamples. The solid black line refers to the entire available sample, i.e. the benchmark choice of 1973:4 to 2016:9. The dashed blue line refers to the pre-crisis sample, i.e. 1973:4 to 2008:6. Note that this is almost identical to the sample used by [Forni and Gambetti](#page-11-0) [\(2010\)](#page-11-0), which ends in 2007:11. Lastly, the red dash-dot line refers to the sample used by [Gertler and Karadi](#page-11-3) [\(2015\)](#page-11-3), i.e. 1979:7 to 2012:6. The starting point of their sample coincides with the start of Paul Volcker's tenure as Federal Reserve chair, which they argue marks a regime change in the conduct of US monetary policy.



Figure A7: Subsample robustness of Figure 1



Figure A8: Subsample robustness of Figure 2



Figure A9: Subsample robustness of Figure 3

## 2 Further Details

#### 2.1 Identification Schemes

By rearranging Equations (1) and (2) from the main text, one obtains the impulse-response functions, i.e. the effect of structural shocks on observable variables, we are ultimately interested in:

$$
\Lambda \Phi(L)^{-1} G H \epsilon_t = \Omega(L) H \epsilon_t. \tag{1}
$$

The key challenge is to identify the rotation matrix  $H$ , which links the reduced-form shocks  $u_t$  to the structural shocks  $\epsilon_t$ :

<span id="page-6-1"></span>
$$
u_t = H \epsilon_t.
$$
  
\n
$$
q \times 1 \qquad q \times q \times 1
$$
\n(2)

#### <span id="page-6-0"></span>2.1.1 Recursive Cholesky

A recursive identification scheme identifies  $H$  by imposing zero restrictions on the contemporaneous effect of structural shocks on observable variables. In VARs, this is achieved by setting the identification matrix to the lower triangular Cholesky decomposition of the covariance matrix of the reduced-form shocks, i.e.  $H = chol(\Sigma_u)$  with  $\Sigma_u = E(u_t u'_t)$ . Analogously, a recursive identification scheme in the DFM is implemented by picking a  $q \times q$  submatrix  $\Omega_0^*$  and setting  $H = \Omega_0^{*-1} chol(\Omega_0^* \Omega_0^{*'})$ . Recall that  $\Omega_0H$  captures the impact effect of structural shocks  $\epsilon_t$  on observable variables  $X_t$ .

As in [Forni and Gambetti](#page-11-0) [\(2010\)](#page-11-0), maximum comparability between VAR and DFM results is ensured by i) using the same number of VAR variables and dynamic factors (i.e. assuming  $q = 4$  structural shocks in both cases, see main text), ii) picking the first three rows in  $\Omega_0^*$  in accordance to the first three variables in  $Y_t^{\text{VAR}}$ , i.e. industrial production, consumer prices and the one-year government bond rate, and iii) assuming the monetary policy shock to be the third one.

#### 2.1.2 External Instrument

The external instrument identification scheme does not impose any restrictions on the contemporaneous effects of shocks. Rewrite Equation [\(2\)](#page-6-1)

$$
u_t = H\epsilon_t = [H_1 \dots H_q] \begin{pmatrix} \epsilon_{1t} \\ \vdots \\ \epsilon_{qt} \end{pmatrix}
$$
 (3)

with  $H_1$  being the first column of H,  $\epsilon_{1t}$  the first structural shock, and so forth. Hence,  $\Sigma_{uu} = H\Sigma_{\epsilon\epsilon}H'$ and  $\Sigma_{\epsilon\epsilon} = E(\epsilon_t \epsilon'_t)$ . Since we are only interested in the effects of monetary policy shocks, we need to identify only one column of  $H$ . Without loss of generality, we can assume the monetary policy shock to be the first one  $(\epsilon_{1t})$  and hence try to identify  $H_1$ .

Given an instrumental variable  $Z_t$  that meets the familiar relevance  $(E(\epsilon_{1t}Z_t) = \alpha \neq 0)$  and exogeneity condition  $(E(\epsilon_{it}Z_t) = 0, j = 2, \dots, q)$ , we can write:

<span id="page-6-3"></span>
$$
\begin{bmatrix} E(u_{1t}Z_t) \\ E(u_{\bullet t}Z_t) \end{bmatrix} = E(u_tZ_t) = E(H\epsilon_t Z_t) = [H_1H_{\bullet}] \begin{bmatrix} E(\epsilon_{1t}Z_t) \\ E(\epsilon_{\bullet t}Z_t) \end{bmatrix} = H_1\alpha.
$$
 (4)

 $H_1$  is thus identified up to scale and sign by the coefficients of a regression of the instrument  $Z_t$  on all reduced-form shocks  $u_t$ . To uniquely identify the column  $H_1$  a normalization of the shocks' impact effect on some observable variable suffices.

<span id="page-6-2"></span><sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Here I make use of a partitioning notation, i.e.  $u_{\bullet t}$  denotes all  $u_t$  except  $u_{1t}$  and  $H_{\bullet}$  denotes all columns in H except the first.

As described in the main text,  $Z_t$  is based on futures price movements around FOMC meetings. In order to match the monthly frequency of the other variables, the daily price movements are thus cumulated. The instrument is available from 1991:1 to 2012:6 and updates the original series in [Gürkaynak](#page-11-2) [et al.](#page-11-2) [\(2005\)](#page-11-2). Since the time spans of  $Z_t$  and  $X_t$  do not match, I use the full available sample - i.e. 1973:4 to 2016:9 - to estimate the model dynamics, and use the maximum common sample with the instrument - i.e. 1991:1 to 2012:6 - to identify the monetary policy shock (Equation [4\)](#page-6-3).

Importantly, interest rate futures do not only react to decisions about the current policy rate, but also to announcements about the future path of rates ("forward guidance"). [Gürkaynak et al.](#page-11-2) [\(2005\)](#page-11-2) show that these announcements are the dominant driver behind monetary policy effects and their relevance has evidently increased since the recent crisis. In this sense, the futures series appear well-suited for their use as external instruments.

#### 2.2 Unobservability of the Shock and Instrument Relevance

Recall that the current object of interest - a monetary policy shock - is not completely observable. If it were, the thorny business of identification could be completely avoided after all.<sup>[2](#page-7-0)</sup> Monetary policy shocks are arguably best thought of as unexpected deviations from a policy rule or unexpected changes to the policy rule itself (e.g. via shifts in policy preferences), see [Ramey](#page-12-1) [\(2016\)](#page-12-1). To ensure that such policy surprises are truly unanticipated, furthermore, high-frequency financial futures data is arguably ideal.

So given [Gürkaynak et al.](#page-11-2) [\(2005\)](#page-11-2)'s measure of policy surprises, why should we still think of monetary policy shocks as unobservable? A major reason is that [Gürkaynak et al.](#page-11-2) [\(2005\)](#page-11-2) only incorporate futures surprises around FOMC meetings and official FOMC statements are hardly the only source of information about (future) monetary policy. In fact, market participants exploit a wealth of sources when forming their expectations about monetary policy, including speeches, interviews and testimonies of FOMC members, let alone more informal communication of Fed officials with the media and financial sector (see [Cieslak](#page-11-4) [et al.,](#page-11-4) [2016\)](#page-11-4). Indeed, it is arguably impossible to completely capture all the ways in which policy makers potentially influence market expectations about their (future) policy.

Evidently, the futures surprises of [Gürkaynak et al.](#page-11-2) [\(2005\)](#page-11-2) are therefore best thought of as noisy measures correlated with the monetary policy shock, not as the shock itself. The futures surprises can thus serve as an instrumental variable for the true shock, but since the shock itself is not directly observable, the relevance condition of the instrument is not directly testable either (see e.g. [Montiel-Olea et al.,](#page-12-2) [2015\)](#page-12-2).[3](#page-7-1) Consequently, the common practice of testing for the "strength of the instrument" appears to be of somewhat questionable merit in the current context.[4](#page-7-2)

Having said that, a poor instrument will impede a sharp identification of the monetary policy shock. An indirect approach to assess the nexus between the two is to regress the instrument  $Z_t$  on all reducedform form shocks  $u_t$  (cf. [Stock and Watson,](#page-12-3) [2012\)](#page-12-3). In the case of [Gertler and Karadi](#page-11-3) [\(2015\)](#page-11-3)'s VAR - and FAVAR extensions thereof - this approach yields F-statistics well above the conventional threshold value of ten. For the dynamic factor model, in contrast, the respective F-statistics are considerably lower. As is well known, inference is non-trivial in the presence of weak instruments. Alas, the literature does not yet provide readily available methods to address this issue in the DFM framework, see [Stock and Watson](#page-12-4) [\(2016\)](#page-12-4) for a recent stocktaking of relevant research, and in particular [Montiel-Olea et al.](#page-12-2) [\(2015\)](#page-12-2) for an application to VAR models.

<span id="page-7-1"></span><span id="page-7-0"></span><sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Note that this is precisely the strategy some authors have pursued, see e.g. [Cochrane and Piazzesi](#page-11-5) [\(2002\)](#page-11-5).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>This is in contrast to traditional microeconomic settings, where instruments are used for an endogenous - but observable variable. Here, only the exogeneity condition has to be assumed, whereas the relevance of the instrument can be tested in a "firststage" regression.

<span id="page-7-2"></span><sup>4</sup>The exposition in [Gertler and Karadi](#page-11-3) [\(2015\)](#page-11-3) might therefore appear slightly misleading. They try to test the relevance condition by regressing the VAR innovations of their monetary policy equation on candidate instruments. Yet, as pointed out above, the external instrument identification scheme can be applied to an arbitrary column of  $H$ . The selection of a VAR equation and its residuals in the first stage regression is thus also to some extent arbitrary.

#### 2.3 Bootstrap Procedure

To account for both estimation and identification uncertainty, I follow [Mertens and Ravn](#page-12-5) [\(2013\)](#page-12-5) and [Gertler and Karadi](#page-11-3) [\(2015\)](#page-11-3) and apply the wild bootstrapping procedure developed by [Goncalves and Kilian](#page-11-6) [\(2004\)](#page-11-6). This procedures generates artificial data samples by changing the sign of the estimated reduced form shocks  $u_t$  in Equation [\(2\)](#page-6-1) and the instrument  $Z_t$  for randomly selected time periods.

In the DFM and FAVAR case, one further needs to incorporate the sampling uncertainty of idiosyncratic components. Here I apply the parametric bootstrap suggested by [Stock and Watson](#page-12-4) [\(2016,](#page-12-4) p. 56), i.e. each error term  $e_i$  $\sum$ ), i.e. each error term  $e_i$  is assumed to follow an univariate autoregressive AR(4) process:  $e_{it} = \frac{4}{p-1} \beta_p^i e_{i,t-p} + \zeta_{it}$ . Then, draw  $\tilde{\zeta}_i \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \hat{\sigma}_{\zeta_i})$  and use this draw in conjunction with the autoreg sive coefficients  $\beta_p^i$  to generate an artificial series of idiosyncratic errors  $e_i$ .

The number of bootstrap draws is set to 2000. For the sake of consistency, I apply the same bootstrap method for all empirical models and report 90% confidence bands throughout.

# 3 Dataset

#### Table A1: Dataset Description



### Table A1: Dataset Description



#	Description	tcode	Note
107	S&P's Composite Common Stock: Price-Earnings Ratio	5	
108	<b>VXO</b>	1	
Interest and exchange rates			
109	<b>Effective Federal Funds Rate</b>	1	
110	3-Month AA Financial Commercial Paper Rate		spread over 3M Treasury Bill
111	3-Month Treasury Bill		
112	6-Month Treasury Bill		
113	1-Year Treasury Rate		
114	5-Year Treasury Rate		
115	10-Year Treasury Rate		
116	Moody's Seasoned Aaa Corporate Bond Yield		spread over 10Y Treasury Rate
117	Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield	1	spread over 10Y Treasury Rate
118	30-Year Fixed Rate Mortgage US	1	from FRED; spread over 10Y Treasury Rate
119	Excess bond premium	1	from Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012)
120	Switzerland - U.S. short-term Interest Rate Spread	1	cf. Forni and Gambetti (2010)
121	Japan - U.S. short-term Interest Rate Spread	1	cf. Forni and Gambetti (2010)
122	U.K. - U.S. short-term Interest Rate Spread		cf. Forni and Gambetti (2010)
123	Canada - U.S. short-term Interest Rate Spread	1	cf. Forni and Gambetti (2010)
124	Trade Weighted U.S. Dollar Index: Major Currencies	5	
125	Switzerland / U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate	5	
126	Japan / U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate	5	
127	U.K. / U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate	5	
128	Canada / U.S. Foreign Exchange Rate	5	
129	Switzerland / U.S. Real Exchange Rate	4	based on CPI, cf. Forni and Gambetti (2010)
130	Japan / U.S. Real Exchange Rate	4	based on CPI, cf. Forni and Gambetti (2010)
131	U.K. / U.S. Real Exchange Rate	4	based on CPI, cf. Forni and Gambetti (2010)
132	Canada / U.S. Real Exchange Rate	4	based on CPI, cf. Forni and Gambetti (2010)

Table A1: Dataset Description

Note: tcode refers to the applied transformation code (1: level, 4: log-level, 5: log-difference). If not otherwise specified, variables are taken from [McCracken and Ng](#page-12-6) [\(2016\)](#page-12-6)'s dataset (2017-02 vintage). I retrieve some discontinued series from FRED and Datastream, drop some redundant series, transform private sector interest rates into spreads, and add short-term interest rate spreads and real exchange rates (CPI based) between the US and Switzerland, Japan, the United Kingdom, and Canada. The industrial production and consumer price index (marked \*) are kept in log-levels when used as observable variables (see main text).

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