sym.f
Creators:
Olivier Armantier
;
Jean-Pierre Florens
;
Jean-François Richard
From the dataset abstract
We define a new concept of constrained strategic equilibrium (CSE) for Bayesian games. We show that a sequence of CSEs approximates an equilibrium under standard conditions. We also...
Source: Approximation of Nash equilibria in Bayesian games (replication data)
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Metadata
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Format | f |
| License | CC-BY 4.0 |
| URL | https://jda-test.zbw.eu/dataset/23640b14-ec88-4171-99ea-2c2d76cacd69/resource/893e26d9-c122-4a55-9812-ef5b449123be/download/sym.f |
| Last updated | November 4, 2022 |
| Created | November 4, 2022 |
